CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION OF LOCAL
AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION IN PENNSYLVANIA.
(Third Paper;)
- In connection with the principle just discussed (viz, that
any classification of cities must provide for a free movement
from one class to another as the municipalities increase in
population) should be mentioned another boundary within
which the courts have confined the legislature. They have
decided that while the legislature is the primary judge of
the propriety and advisability of a classification which they
are about to make, yet such classification must in fact be
reasonable and the court is the final judge of its reasonableness.
By this is meant that there must be such a distinction
between the classes that legislation suitable for one would
be burdensome and oppressive for the others. This is the
first limitation referred to above as laid down in Wheeler v.
Philadelihia. This unreasonableness may consist in an unnecessarily extended subdivision into classes of a subjectmatter proper for classification, or it may consist in classifying subjects which are improper for classification, i. e.,
where laws applying to the entire subject-matter would be
appropriate and reasonable.
The views of the court with respect to the first kind of
unreasonableness are well expressed in Ayars' Appeal.' In
that case an act was under discussion which divided the
cities of the state into seven classes upon the basis of their
population. It was argued that inasmuch as the court had
already decided that the legislature had the p6wer to classify
cities upon that basis, it followed that the legislature was
the sole judge of the reasonableness of the classification.
The court, however, pr6mptly negatived this proposition,
and declared that it was always the function of the court to
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inquire into the matter and if they found tle law unreasonable to declare it void. The decision was rested very largely
on the ground that classification was made a pretext, under
the guise of which local and special laws were passed. Mr.
Chief Justice Sterrett saying:
"Some of the cases above-cited have been quoted at considerable length for the purpose of showing that. this court
never intended to sanction classificatioh as a pretext for
special or local legislation. On the contrary, -the underlying principle of all the cases is that classification, with the
view of legislating for either class separately, is essentially
unconstitutional, unless a necessity tlierefor exists-a necessityspringing from manifest peculiarities, clearly distinguishing those of one class from each of the other classes, and
imperatively demanding legislation for each class, separately,
that would be useless and detrimental to the others. Laws
enacted in pursuance of such classification and for such purposes, are, properly speaking, neither local nor special. They
are general laws, because they apply alike to all ihat are
similarly situated as to their peculiar necessities. All legislation is necessarily based on a classification of its subjects,
and when such classification is fairly made, laws enacted in
conformity thereto cannot be properly characterized as either
local or special. A law prescribing the mode of incorporating all railroad companies, is"special, in the narrow sense
that it is confined in its operations to one kind of corporations only;, and, by the same test, a law providing a single
system for organization and government of boroughs in the
state, would be a local law; but every one conversant with
the meaning of those words, when used in that connection,
would unhesitatingly pronounce such statutes general laws.
But, as was said in Scowden's Appeal, supra, 'classification
which is grounded on no necessity and has for its sole object
an evasion of the constitution' is quite a different thing."
The plain reason for the decision in this case, was the fact
that seven classes of cities are unnecessary. The court must
be the judge- of the reasonableness of the classification or
there will be nothing to prevent the legislature from dividing the cities into as many classes as there are cities and thus
enacting laws for each one separately. The classification
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of whatever nature it be must owe its existence to some valid
distinction between the classes thus separated from each
other. The legislature cannot select a small number of
cities or counties from all the rest and legislate for them
alone even though the distinction be one of population.
Thus, in Scowden's Appeal,2 an act which was to apply only
to counties of 6oooo inhabitants, containing a city of the
fifth class, was held invalid. There is no reason why counties of that size and containing such cities should be subject
to laws which do not apply to the other counties in the state.
Mr. Justice Paxson said:
"The act of June 12, 1879, makes no- attempt at the
classification of cities. It is merely an effort to legislate for
certain cities of the fifth class to the exclusion of all -other
cities of the same class. That is to say, it refers only to cities
of the fifth class which are situated in a county having a
population of 6o,ooo. The act was doubtless regarded by
its framers as a classification of counties, but it is not so.
Nor does any good reason occur to my mind why there
should be such classification. If there be such reasons,
amounting to a necessity therefor, we shall probably hear of
them in due season. In the meantime classification which
is grounded in no necessity, and has for its sole object an
evasion of the constitution will not be encouraged."
Referring to the second kind of unreasonableness in classification, there may be some subjects about which no classification can be permitted for the reason that laws strictly
general will be appropriate. Following the classification of
cities acts were passed which divided counties into groups,
based upon their population, and legislation for each of
these groups was upheld. The limitations as to the character of the classification are the same as in the case of
cities.3
In Chalfant v. Edwards,4 the question of the constitutionality of the classification of school districts was raised.
In that case it appeared that the legislature had passed an
296
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act regulating the affairs of school districts in cities of the
second class. The court held it unconstitutional because the
act originally classifying cities had classified them for purposes of legislation concerning corporate powers only and
had not contemplated legislation concerning other subjects.
Mr. Justice Williams said:
"It is contended that he (the presiding judge of the lower
court) was in error in holding the act that provides a new
system for cities of the second class to be local and therefore
unconstitutional, as its provisions include all the members of
the class of cities to which it relates. It is true that the classification of cities was upheld in Wheeler v. The City of Philadelphia,4a but the object of classification is very clearly stated
in'the act of 1874, that provides for it. It is to facilitate
municipal government. The common school system of this
state rests on the general law of 1854, it is largely supported
by state appropriations, and is under the general supervision of a state superintendent. School directors are by
no means municipal officers. They are not invested with
any of the municipal powers nor are they charged with thie
performance of municipal functions. An attempt to regulate the affairs of school districts by local or special laws is
expressly forbidden by the constitution in Article III, Section 52, and until the common schools can be regarded as
a part.of the municipal machinery necessary for the government of cities, this act which relates to cities of the second
class must be treated as local in its character. Many efforts
have been made to make the classification of cities for municipal purposes serve as. a warrant for local legislation on
subjects having no possible relation to municipal government, but this court has uniformly refused to sanction
them.

.

"The act now before us was passed to establish a local
system. Its results were intended to be local, and only local.
*They can by no possibility be anything but local. It is,
therefore, squarely within the rule laid down in the appeal
of the Scranton School District as well as squarely Within
the words of the constitutional prohibition. It is beyond
the power of the legislature to enact, and absolutely void.
The learned judge of the court below was right in his con"a 77 Pa. 338.
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clusion upon this subject, and the assignments of error relating to this question are overruled."
In re Sugar Notch Borough,5 an act relating to boroughs
and which also affected such school districts as were co-extensive with boroughs was upheld. The court distinguished
Chalfant v. Edwards, saying that it was decided on the
ground that there had been no classification of school districts-not that such a classification could not be made. Mr.
Justice Mitchell said:
"There is no constitutional objection to the classification
of school districts any more than of cities. Both are included
in the same clause of the constitution prohibitory of local
and special legislation, and there is no argument against
classification of one that is not equally forcible against the
other. But classification may become as necessary for school
districts as for citis. The needs and the capabilities of
school districts may differ as substantially, ifnot as widely,
as those of cities. They already differ in the number and authority of the school officers, the extent and mode of assessing
and collecting school taxes, etc. It would be a most unfortunate clog on the improvement of our school system in Philadelphia, Pittsburg, Allegheny, and other cities could not have
their high schools, their manual training or industrial
schools, or even their kindergardens, without the necessity
of imposing the expense of a similar establishment on every
borough and sparsely populated township in the state. There
is nothing contrary to these views in Chalfant v. Edwards,5 a
so much relied on by appellee.
"On the other question the court below was affirmed on the
ground that the act of 1874, classified cities solely with
reference to strictly municipal functions, and schools, under
the general law of 1854, and its supplements, could not as
yet be considered a branch of the municipal government.
Much of what was said by our late Brother Williams on
this subject was by way of historical review of our school
system, rather than of discussion and of constitutional
powers. Whether some of the expressions did not go beyond what the case called foi, and farther than can be ulti':
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mately sustained we need not now consider. The utmost
that the case can even be claimed to be authority for, is not
that the legislature may not classify school districts with
reference to cities, but that it has not yet done so."
InCommonwealth v. Gilligan6 substantially the same question was presented as in Chalfant v. Edwards. The act of
1874 was attacked on the ground that it regulated the affairs
of school districts in cities of the thiid class. The court,
however,upheld it, saying there was an implied if not an express classification of school districts in the act. Mr. Justice
Mitchell said:
"The classification of school districts intended by the act
of 1874 is upon lines of distinction as genuine and as fundamental as its classification of cities themselves. Both cities
and school districts exercise functions which are governmental in character, and they necessarily run closely together.
The.legislature may recognize this fact, and provide for the
regulation of the two powers concurrently in the same territory as far as they relate to the same or similar matters, so
that the same governmental functions, as for instance- the
supreme power of arbitrarily taking the citizen's property
by taxation, shall be exercised harmoniously over the inhabitants of the same district."
The apparent change of view on this question, brought
about after the death of Mr. Justice Williams, seems to
shoW a drift of the court toward a more liberal interpretation of laws which are close to the border line of the constitution.
Classification of other things and for other purposes has
on the same general principles been very generally allowed.
A proper classification of persons is upheld as not in conflict with the clause forbidding special legislation, just as
classification of cities is deemed not to be in contravention of
the clause prohibiting local legislation.
In Kennedy v. Insurance Company,7 a classification of insurance companies was upheld. The following extract from
the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Sterrett explains the groundr
of the decision:
a195 Pa. 504 (Igao).
'1I65Pa. 179 (1895).
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"The act is not obnoxious to the objection that it is
special legislation and therefore unconstitutional. Foreign
insurance companies, licensed to transact business in this
state, have always been considered and are in fact essentially a distinct class of corporations, justifying and requiring legislation appropriate to the class itself. If such companies, owing their existence to some authority outside and
not having their principal offices within the state, are pernitted to transact business here, it must necessarily be upon
such terms and conditions as will enable the insurance
department of the commonwealth to supervise their business
operations, etc., and place them within easy and convenient
reach of process at the suit of the commonwealth or any of
its citizens."
In Commonwealth v. Jones,8 the classification of coal
mines for purposes of enacting police regulations for each
class separately was upheld. In Commonwealth v. Wilson,0
an act prescribing the terms upon which persons should be
licensed to practice- medicine and though operating differently upon different classes of physicians, etc., was deemed
valid. In Commonwealth v. Zacharias,'° an act which
operated unequally upon different classes of applicants for a
license to engage in the drug business, was declared unconstitutional, in view of the fact that all applicants whom the
act was to affect were equally unskilled. Such an act was
very properly held to be not only special but unjust in its
operation. This case was approved in Clark's Estate,1
where a law operating unequally on corporations and individuals was held special and void.
In Commonwealth v. Hanley,12 an act was upheld, which
regulated the business of undertaking in cities of the first,
second, and third classes. It was deemed to be a mere police
regulation and to operate only incidentally upon the persons
affected.
In Seabolt v. Commissioners,'8 it was decided that bridges
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were a-proper subject of classification and legislation for
each class would be valid. In Commonwealth v. Blackley,14
the classification of townships with respect to their density
of population was sanctioned. The court said if townships
of different densities had different needs there was no reason why such a distinction should not be drawn. The present tendency of the Supreme Court seems to be to uphold
classification of any subject at all for purposes of legislation,
provided any reasonable grotind upon which to base a distinction between the classes can be discerned.
II.

UPON WHAT SUBJECTS LAWS RELATING TO A SINGLE
CLASS MAY BE. ENACTED.

Although the classification provided by the act may be
perfecly reasonable and proper, it does not follow that all
laws relating to a single class will be constitutional. The
subject-matter of the law must be one that has a distinct
relation to the peculiarities of the class to which it applies.
Thus, where cities have been classified upon the basis of
their population, a law confined in its application to one of
those classes must relate to a subject, upon which legislation
for cities of all sizes would not only be inappropriate'but
would.be burdensome and oppressive to cities of the other
classes. Hence, after discussing the principles relating to
classificatiofn it becomes necessary to consider how to determine upon what character of subjects laws relating to a
single class can be enacted. The most common instances
where such questions have been raised are in cases where
laws have been passed relating to a single class of cities-the
principles as there laid down will also serve to illustrate the
rules by which such questions are in general to be decided.
In the act of 1874, the reason for the classification of
cities is stated to be:
"For the exercise of certain corporate powers, and having respect to the number, character, powers, and duties of
certain officers thereof."
U198
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Under this act it has been decided that a law relating to a
single class of cities, to be valid, must:
I. Relate to the exercise of corporate powers.
2. Affect all the cities of the given class in the same
manner.
3. Affect the inhabitants of the cities because of their
residence therein and because of the circumstances and needs
that are peculiar to the class to which the city in question
belongs. 5
Thus, in Ruan Street,"6 a law relating to the opening
and widening of streets in cities of the first class was held
unconstitutional because the "opening of streets" was
thought not to be a subject "relating to the corporate
powers." Mr. Justice Williams said in that case:
"But answering affirmatively, I will adopt the words of
the act of 1874, and say that classification authorizes such
legislation as relates to the exercise of the 'corporate powers
possessed by cities of the particular class to which the legislation relates and to the 'number, character, powers and'
duties' of the officers employed in the management of municipal affairs. These are the purposes contemplated by the
legislature, they are the only purposes for which classificationr
seems desirable; they are the only purposes for which it has
been upheld by this court.
"Among the many subjects of legislation which classification presents, we may call attention to such as the establishment, maintenance and control of an adequate police
force for the public protection; the preservation of the public health; protection against fire; the provision of an adequate water supply; the paving, grading, curbing, and lighting of the public streets, the regulation of markets and market houses, of docks and wharves, the erection and care of
public buildings, and other municipal improvements. These
are mentioned, not because they include all the subjects for
the exercise of municipal powers, but as a suggestion of some
of the more obvious ones, and as an.illustration of the character of the subjects upon. which legislation for the classiWyoming Street, 137 Pa. 494 (1891).
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fled cities may be necessary. These classes are thus seen to
embrace not mere geographical subdivisions of tht territory
of the state, but organized municipalities, which are divided
with reference to their own peculiar characteristics and
needs; and the legislation to which they are entitled by virtue of such division is simply that which relates to the peculiarities and need which induce the division. In this way
each class may be provided with legislation appropriate to it,
without imposing the same provisions on other classes to
which they would be unsuitable and burdensome."
In Weinman v. Railroad Company,1" an act relating to
the incorporation of street car companies in cities of the second and third classes, was held invalid because it applied
only to those cQrporations which-happened to be situated in
those cities. The subject-matter had no relation to corporate
powers and general laws only should be sanctioned concerning it. ' This case was distinguished by the court in Reeves
v. Traction Company,'8 where an act, repealing the restrictions of street car companies to the use of horse power in
cities of the first class, was upheld. In Betz v. Philadelphia9
a law changing the method of collecting debts and enforcing judgment in cities of the first class was declared void.
Among other subjects which have been declared by the
courts to be improper for class legislation are the creation
and extension of liens, 2 0 and a regulation forbidding the
location of cemeteries in proximity to cities of the first

2
class. '

The language in the act of 1889 redividing the cities of
Pennsylvania into classes differs slightly from that of the
act of 1874. The purpose evidently was to increase the
subjects concerning which legislation-might be enacted for
each class separably. The act provides:
"That for the purposes of legislation, regulating their
municipal affairs, the exercise of certain corporate powers
and having respect to the number, character, powers and
11I8 Pa. 192 (iM).
-
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duties of certain officers thereof, the cities now in existence
and those to be hereafter created in this commonwealth, shall
22
be divided into three classes," etc.

Even under this act legislation cannot be supported, unless
it relates to the exercise of corporate powers, 23 and it must
conform in all other respects to the principles already referred to. The theory at the bottom of all classification is
that the terms of an act concerning a particular subject cannot without being "burdensome and oppressive" apply to
more than one class. Hence if we have a law relating to a
subject to which the size of the community has no relation
it would be obviously improper to confine its application to a
single class of cities. This is very well illustrated in the
very recent case of Commonwealth v. Hospital,24 where an
act had been passed which had relation to the location of
hospitals and pest houses within the built-up portions of
cities. It was pointed out that while legislation concerning
some evils 'could not be confined to a community of a particular size, yet the law before the court was valid because
there was a reason why the location of hospitals in crowded
communities should be regulated in a manner different from
that in which the same institutions are regulated when
located in more sparsely settled districts, in which case less
stringent laws would be sufficient.
Mr. Justice Shafer in delivering the opinion of the lower
court, which was affirmed on appeal, said:
"If the legislature for the protection of health in cities,
should undertake to prohibit the sale of cigarettes to minors,
or oleomargarine to anybody in all the cities of the commonwealth, it could not be claimed that the act was valid.
There must be the additional element, that the danger to be
guarded against has relation to the local conditions. Cigarettes and oleomargarine are equally deadly in the forest and
in the city; but not so a hospital or pest house. .
"There is obviously much greater danger to the general
public health from such institutions in a populous city than
" P. L. (IS89), I33.
'Safe Deposit Co. v. Fricke, 152 Pa. 231 (1893) ; Van Loon v. Engle.
171 Pa. 157 (1895).
2"198 Pa. 270 (9o0.
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in the country, or in a village, and the danger will be in proportion to the number and density of the population, permanent and transient."
In the very recent case of Commonwealth v. Moir,2 5 the
Supreme Court upheld the so-called "Pittsburg Ripper Bill."
This act abolished the existing city governments in cities
of the second class and substituted therefor anothei system,
similar in most of its features, but differing in the name of
the principal executive officer of the city and in a.few other
particulars. The act also provided that the contemplated
change should go into effect at once and gave to the governor
the power to fill the office of recorder, and his appointee was
to hold office for more than a year-although an election
intervened, when the people might fill the office with a man
of their own choice.
The majority of the court decided inter alia:
I. The law, relating to the corporate government of
cities of the second class, was, on its face, general and the
court could not inquire into the motives of the legislature.
2. The provision vesting the appointive power in the governor was merely a temporary expedient for putting the
law into effect and could not render it unconstitutional.
The law was passed for an obviously improper purpose,
viz, to throw into the hands of the political faction, then
in power at Harrisburg, the pafronage of the city of Pittsburg. -This vicious purpose and the inherently bad character of the.law was fully recognized by the court. Mr.
Justice Mitchell, who delivered the majority opinion, saying:
"The fact that the action of the state towards it§ municipal agents may be unwise, unjust, oppressive, or violative
of the natural or political rights of their citizens, is not one
which can be made the basis of action by the judiciary.
- "The public interest of the questions involved, though not
always their difficulty, has led us to discuss thus in detail
the specific objections to the act that the learning. and
ingenuity of eminent counsel have been able to suggest.
2
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There remains one which is based upon broader and more
far reaching considerations than the others, though like
most of them it is directed against the schedule. Indeed, the
objections to this act may be summed up in the classic phrase
in cauda venenum est. It is urged that it violates the spirit
of the constitution in those provisions and that general intent
which preserves to the people the right of local self-government.
. "The objection is serious, and there can be no denial that
some of the provisions of the schedule infringe upon. what
the citizens generally are accustomed to regard as their
political rights. But our view must be confined closely and
exclusively to the constitution."
Mr. Justice Dean vigorously dissented and to many members of the profession his opinion commends itself as being
sounder than-that of the majority. Justices McCollum and
Mestrezat concurred in the dissent.
Omitting the minor questions, the main point upon which
the court were divided in opinion was that relating to the
local legislation phase of the law. The following questions
are pertinent:
I. Was there an imperious necessity for a city government
as provided for cities of the second class, which necessity
did not exist for cities of the first or third classes?
2. Was the law passed in good faith to answer a need
felt by reason of some peculiarity of cities of the second
class, or was its apparent general character a mere subterfuge to cover up a law really local in its effects and purposes?
It was said by the majority that they could not inquire
into these matters. Mr. Justice Mitchell's language is:
"Secondly, it is objected that the act attempts a classification in the method of filling municipal offices and of exercising municipal powers resting on no proper discrimination or foundation, in that it provides for methods of government and administration of cities of the second class different from those required in cities of the first and third
class, in particulars where there is no real difference. It
is sufficient to say of this that it is a legislative, not a judicial
question. The very object of classification is to provide
different systems of government for cities differently situ-
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ated in regard to their municipal needs. It was recognized
that cities varying greatly in population will probably vary
so greatly in the amount, imporiance and complexity of
their municipal business, as to require different officers and
different systems of administration. Classification, therefore, is based on difference of municipal affairs, and so long
as it relates to and deals with such affairs, the questions of
where the lines shall be drawn, and what 'differences of system shall be prescribed for differences of 'situation, are
wholly legislative. What is a distinction without a difference is -largely matter of opinion."
In view of the cases already discussed it seems that the
court took a new stand by disclaiming any power to inquire
whether the law was in fact general or was only a cloak for
a local enactment. Mr. Justice Dean remarks:
"All our recent decisions are to the effect that if local
results either are or. may be produced by a piece of legislation, it offends against the article prohibiting local and
special legislation.
"It is too late, after these decisions, to disclaim our
judicial power to inquire, whether the act before us is an
adroit attempt to evade the constitutional prohibition against
local and special legislation. From its very terms it touches
no subject which is not common to every other city in,the
commonwealth, and if there bd a necessity for such legislation in these three cities, then there is the same necessity in
all the others. This fact of itself stamps it as local and
special legislation, for as is said in Ayars" Appeal, supra,
there must be a necessity for the legislation 'springing from
manifest peculiarities, clearly distinguishing those of one
class from each of the others.' No peculiarities in cities
of the second class demanding such a law are even pretended.
Every member of this court concedes that this legislation
is vicir us., Why? They do not answer; but, to my mind,
-it is apparent that its vice consists in its flagrant violation
of the fundamental law. We know its purpose was to oust
one set of municipal officers in three certain cities, put in
place, either directly or indirectly, by the people, and give
their offices to others, through the chief executive of the
state. This is the inevitable result from the bill itself. Can
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we assume that our lawmakers do not intend the obvious
results of their acts ?"
As was pointed out in the earlier part of this paper the
purpose of the convention was to restrain the legislature
from enacting vicious laws, in defiance of the wishes of the
people of the locality affected. Particularly was it its purpose to prevent legislation which aimed to foster private
interests. This law is in direct defiance of both of those
aims. It wrests the local government, at least temporarily,
from the hands of the local community and it does so for the
purp6se of augmenting the political power of one faction
and of wreaking vengeance upon another. Under these
facts it seems that the court might with propriety have
inquired into the real purpose of the law as disclosed both
by its main body and by its schedule and have declared it
void because of the very evident purpose to legislate for
certain local communities to the exclusion of the remainder
of the state. As Mr. Justice Dean says:
"What the next.step in this direction will be we can only
conjecture; factional politics and partisan politics are not
troubled by scruples; under the principle of this decision,
there is nothing to hinder a hostile partisan majority in the
legislature from ousting the party in power in Philadelphia,
a city of the first class, and placing its government in possession of the minority. The time is not very remote in the
past, in English politics, when the victorious political party,
as soon as it was seated in power, promptly proceeded to
cut off the physical heads of their leading antagonists and
confiscate their property; it is not very remote in the future
when the victorious political party will promptly proceed to
cut off the political heads of its opponents where they hold
office by the municipal votes of cities."
It is submitted that to prohibit legislation for such purposes as this was the very reason for calling the constitutional convention. Such laws constituted the evil at which
they aimed, and it cannot be doubted that to permit class
legislation of this character was fartherest from their minds
when they enacted the clause forbidding local and special
laws. It is to be hoped that the decision is the high water
mark in the drift of the court away from the limitations
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laid down in the first two decades following :the adoption
of the constitution, if it be too much to say that it would
be a matter for congratulation if a reconsidfration and
ultimate reversal of the case could be brought about.
The view has been advanced that under the constitution
laws in the exercise of the police power may be passed even
though they be local or special and their subject-matter
be among that forbidden by the clause prohibiting local
and special legislation. In Commonwealth v€. Jones,2 6 Mr.
Justice Smith, by way of dictum, said it was his own opinion
though not of the majority of the court that the proper interpretation of the constitution admitted of local laws passed
in the exercise of the police power. The following extract
from his opinion explains his ground for this opinion:
"Speaking -for myself, I regard it important, in considering the constitutional prohibition of 'any local or special
law' upon the subjects enumerated in Article III, Section
7,to take into account the provision of Article.XVI, Section
3, that 'the exercise of the police power of the state shall
never be abridged.' It is difficult to regard the latter provisions as merely aimed at a legislative abridgment of the
police power of the state. The legislature may forbear or
neglect to exercise the police power, but no legislative enactment on the subject can abridge the power of a subsequent
legislature in the premises, and, -as this principle exists
independent of the constitutional provision, it was unnecessary as a limitation on the power of the legislature. These
prohibitive provisions are to be so construed that both shall
stand, if possible. If the prohibition of local or special
legislation includes the exercise of the police power in relation to local or special subjects, it is a serious abridgment
of that power. The broad and urnqualified terms of the
section relating to the police power would seem to imply
-that no abridgment in any manner was intended. Full
effect may be given to this section by regarding it as a
qualification of the prohibition of local or special legislation, in the -nature of a proviso excepting from that prohibition the exercise of the police power of the state on the
-subjects embraced in it. Such a construction would har=4 Superior 362 (1897).
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monize the two constitutional prohibitions, and permit an
unabridged exercise of the police power on all matters
within its scope, whether general, or local and special, leaving to judicial construction ,as heretofore, the character and
limitations of that power. In this view, the act of 1893,
even if local or special in its application, may be sustained
as an exercise of the police power of the state, for the protection of life, health and property in the mining operations
to which it relates. But it is unnecessary to rule the present
case on this construction of these constitutional provisions."
This view is clearly not the view of the Supreme Court as
is seen from the decision in Commonwealth v. Hospital,27
which treats a law for the protection of the public health as
being within the constitutional prohibition. Indeed the view
expressed by Mr. justice Smith can hardly be defended
successfully when we remember that the constitutional clause
which he refers to providing that the exercise of the police
power must never be abridged, was a prohibition laid upon
the legislature, general in its nature and could not operate
to neutralize a positiVe clause of equal authority and of more
particular application in the same instrument. Mr. Justice
Smith says this is not true because in no case could one legislature abridge the power of a subsequent legislature as to
the exercise of the police power and hence the clause would
have no meaning if it did not mean to explain or limit the
preceding clause. It must be remembered, however, that
while it may be that in fact no legislature can by contract
divest itself of the police power, yet the principle even if
settled is of recent growth and it is very consistent with the
views of the law existing at the date of the constitution, that
the members of the convention did in fact intend to forbid
any contract which shall have the effect of in any way
abridging the future exercise of the police power.
III.

EFFECT OF LOCAL LAWS UPON OTHERWISE GENERAL
LEGISLATION.

A local law is one which does not apply to the entire state.
We have seen that although it does not affect the whole
Z'Supra.
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state, if the law operates equally upon all of a class of
municipalities or counties it is general. But there are still
several situations in reference to this question which should
be considered. While the act itself may be general in form,
other acts may affect it or the local authorities may have
such powers under it that the practical effect will be local
legislation.
The constitution itself forestalls any, possibility of local
results being attained by a partial repeal of a. general law
by an express prohibition of such partial repeal.
General laws have, however, been passed at various times
which were to take effect only upon the event of some
subsequent action by local authorities either in county or
city. As such local action might happen in some cities or
counties and not in others the result would seem to be local.
It was so held in Scranton School District's Appeal.2 s In
that case the court declared unconstitutional a proviso to
the act of 1875 because by its terms cities of the third class
already incorporated at the time of its passage could not
become subject to its terms until they had by ordinance
accepted them. The opinion of the court was delivered by
Mr. Justice Green. He said inter alia:
"The proviso to the fifth section of the act of the eighteenth of March, 1875 excludes from the operation of the
act all cities of the third clas and- all cities containing less
than .io,ooo population previously incorporated, which do'
not accept, by an ordinance duly passed, the provisions of
the act. According to this all cities that do accept, will be
subject to the methods of assessment and collection prescribed by the first five sections, and all that do not will not
be so subject, and as to them different methods will prevail.
Whether the methods prescribed by the act shall be the law,
will depend, not .upon the terms of the legislation, but upon
the will of others who are not law-makers at all; and what
may be the law in one city of the third class may not be the
law in another city of the same class. In other words, a
majority of the members of the city councils in any one city
of the third class may impose upon the inhabitants'of that
2

113 Pa. i '6 (i88).

SPECIAL LEGISLATION IN PENNSYLVANIA.

city a method of taxation which may not prevail in any
other city of the commonwealth. A law which authorizes
this to be done is, in our judgment, clearly obnoxious to the
seventh section of the third article of the constitution, which
prohibits the General Assembly from passing any local or
special law regulating the affairs of counties, cities, townships, wards, boroughs, or school districts."
.
The reason given for the decision was the fact that by the
action of local authorities the law in question might be made
to apply to some cities of the third class and not to others.
In Reading v. Savage29 the constitutionality of the act of
1874 was attacked. This act provided inter alia for the goverfiment of cities of the third class and that local laws which
had established existing systems of government should not
be repealed by the act but might from time to time be repealed
by local ordinances. There was a proviso admitting existing cities of the third class and cities of less than IOOOO
inhabitants to the benefit of the law upon the acceptance of
the same by an ordinance. It was urged that this proviso
was within the ruling of Scranton School District'sAppeal,
and, therefore, void. This view of the case was adopted by
Ermentrout, J., and affirmed by the Supreme Court. The
following extract from the opinion shows the ground upon
which the decision was placed:
"Whatever doubts may have been entertained upon this
subject, we feel constrained to say, are settled by the Appeal
of Scranton School District,2 9 a and we hold that the Fiftyseventh Section comes within the constitutional prohibition of special legislation 'regulating the affairs of counties, cities townships, wards, boroughs or school districts.'
We see no difference in principle between this and
the section of the act of March 18, 18 7 5 ,"b declared
unconstitutional in the above-cited case. Whether the law
shall apply is optional in both cases, and the prohibition and
restriction of its provisions equally strong in both, with6ut
proper acceptance by councils. The criterion as to constitutionality seems clear and plain. The classification of cities
under the act of 1874 was held constitutional because of
its generality. The rule laid down applied to every case.
ni2o Pa. x98 (i888).
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There were no exceptions. Wherever the provisions of an
act are compulsorily binding upon every city of the particular
classification, the legislation is general and constitutional.
Wherever the provisions are binding at the option of the
local authorities, the legislation is special, local and unconstitutional. It is the compulsorily binding character of the
law upon all alike in the classification, that gives it constitutional life."
A re-argument was allowed and the decision'was reversed
in Reading v. Savage.3 0 The reasons given for the reversal
of the former decision are not entirely satisfactory. The
only distinction between the facts of Scranton School District's Appeal, and Reading v. Savage, was in the wording
o! the provisos. The necessary effect of both was the same
in that cities of the same class could have different laws. If
we accept the test laid down in the former case that, if the
law renders it possible for two cities of the same class to be
affected differently by the act it must go down, then it seems
hard to escape the conclusion that in reversing Reading v.
Savage, the court also must be taken to have reversed Scranton School District's Appeal. The inconsistency has been
attempted to be explained away by pointing out that in
Reading v. Savage, the law applied to all members of the
class which should subsequently become incorporated 'vithout acceptance on their part, although acceptance was neces-sary for existing cities of the third class and for cities of less
than Io,ooo inhabitants; but in Scranton School District's
Appeal, the necessary result of the proviso was.precisely the
same. There can be no reasonable doubt that if we apply the
test laid down in Scranton School District's Appeal to the
act in Reading v. Savage it too- must fall. If, however, we should push this reasoning to its logical
conclusion we wouild be compelled to condemn all general
laws which do not at the same time repeal all local laws which
are inconsistent therewith, because in stich cases a city with a
government organized under a local law would of course
have a different government from arlother city of the same
size which had accepted the terms of the general act.
VI24 Pa. 328 (89).
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The more rational view of laws whose application to a
particular community depends upon the action of local
authorities is that advanced in Lehigh Valley Coal Company's Appeal,31 where it was said that the true test of the
generality of the law is not whether some counties or cities
.may in fact be affected differently from others, but whether
the law offers equal privileges to all. This is a decided
departure from the language used in Scranton School District'sAppeal, where it was said that the possibility of diverse
laws for members of the same class rendered the law invalid.
3 2 it was contended
In Evans v. Phillipi,
that a general law
which did not at the same time repeal all local laws inconsistent with itself would have a local effect and hence would
be void. The court, however, decided differently saying that
the mere fact that unrepealed local laws intervened would
not render an otherwise general act void. The change from
local to general must come gradually and as one by one the
local laws are repealed the various cities or counties will
come under the operation of the general law, thus constantly
tending toward uniformity.
IV.

STATUS OF LOCAL LAWS PASSED WITHOUT PUBLICATION OF NOTICE.

The constitution provides that acts repealing local laws
may be passed and local laws on some subjects are not pro-

hibited. There is also a clause which says that: "No local
or special bill shall be passed unless notice of the intention to
apply therefor shall have been published in the locality
where the matter or the thing to be affected may be situated,
which notice shall be at least thirty days prior to the introduction into the General Assembly of such bill and in the
manner to be provided by law; the evidence of such notice
having been published shall be exhibited in the General
Assembly before such act shall be passed."
The act of 1874 directed in what manner this notice should
be published in the locality to be affected.
164 Pa. 44 (1894).
117 Pa. 226 (1887).
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It has been decided that, particularly where a local act is
repealed to make way for another local act, notice of such
repealing act must be published in accordance with the constitutional mandate. 83
A question has been raised whether in case a local law had
been regularly passed, it can be attacked on the ground that
no proper notice has been given or whether the constitutional injunction was merely aimed at tl~e conscience of the
legislature and cannot be inquired into collaterally.
The former view was adopted in Perkinsv. Philadelphia,4
Mr. Justice Dean saying: "As to the averment, that the act
also violates Section 8, Article 3, because notice of the proposed legislative action was not published in Philadelphia
at least thirty days before the introduction of the bill, we can
only say, it ii not our duty to go behind the law to inquire
whether all the precedent formalities have in fact been complied with. The evidence that notice has been published
is to be exhibited to the General Assembly; it is not directed
to be entered on the journals. The law before us is certified
by both houses and approved by the governor. We must
presume the requirement as to notice was complied with;
to this effect are all authorities of numerous adjudicated
cases on the same question."
In Chalfant v. Edwards,85 however, the court declared
that if there was no allegation that the proper publication
had been made, then the act should be declared void, for
that reason. The language of Mr. Justice Williams on this
point is: "It now appears that without notice the parties
interested procured the passage of this local law in plain
violation of the constitution. If it appeared that this question had been considered by the legislature and that body
had decided that sufficient notice had been given, or if the
committee to which the bill was referred had reported that
the constitutional requirement as to notice had been complied with, we might feel ourselves concluded by such action.
But there is not the faintest suggestion to be found anywhere that the subject of notice was ever before the mind of
"Chalfant v. Edwards, 173 Pa. 246 (i896).
156 Pa. 554 (1893).
' Supra.
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the legislature or attracted the attention of the promoters of
the bill. If we should hold that, as a general rule in the
absence of any recital or proof upon the subject, notice
should be presumed, yet the presumption cannot prevail
when it is a conceded fact in the case that no notice was
given. The only question then presented is over the validity of an act passed in the face of a clear and positive constitutional prohibition. The learned judge of the court below
was of opinion that as the form and manner of publishing
notice was prescribed by the act of 1874, the legislature of
1895 having equal power in the premises was not bound by
the directions of its predecessor but might disre'gar.d them its pleasure. The power'of' the legislature tc repeal the Act
of 1874 cannot be doubted, but it had not beep exercised.
When this. act was introduced irfc the iegistat.1re and, when
it came up on its final passage, the act of 1874 was in full
force, and the citizens of Pittsburg had a right to rely upon
the observance of its provisions. The point made, however,
does not relate to a compliance with the forms of the act of
1874, but with the substance of the constitutional provision
that makes notice in the locality, and by publication, an
indispensable prerequisite to the passage of a local law. The
legislature of 1895, though not bound by the directions of
its predecessor was bound by the fundamental law, and its
power to pass the repealing act depended on compliance with
its mandate."
In this case it was conceded that in fact no notice had been
given. What the decision would have been in the absence of
such a.concession may perhaps be a matter of conjecture.
It would seem that the view here taken is the more rational
one. The framers of the constitution cannot have meant the
clause requiring notice to be of so little force that the legislature may disregard it at pleasure. They must rather have
intended that even in the absence of an act 'prescribing the
manner of notice, the General Assembly would be compelled
to give the people of the community to be affected an opportunity to be heard, by hotifying them that such law was
about to be introduced.
Thomas Raeburn White.
[THE END.]

